

imagined missile defense and then a visionary president, Ronald Reagan, grasped its potential to defend societies against missiles armed with weapons of mass destruction. In doing so, President Reagan reflected a very American belief that know-how and new thinking can provide security to those who never felt secure under mutual assured destruction.

What bumpkins and dreamers, the conventional arms control theologians declaimed. Let us dismiss these simpletons and disparage their thinking as "Star Wars," they said; as if the Strategic Defense Initiative had anything to do with stars or wars, but instead a more secure world here on earth.

Today, it would be inaccurate to state that we have developed missile defense to a functionally deployable state. But, we are closer to a functional stage than those who dismissed it out-of-hand ever imagined. They were wrong and, today, our challenges to perfecting missile defense are largely in engineering, no longer scientific. A grateful Nation has President Reagan to thank for being able to transcend the conventional wisdom and believe in American creativity and technology to move us into a new strategic era.

But the arms control lobby would not relent, or even reform, through the 1980s and 1990s. We had some good arms control agreements negotiated, signed and ratified—I supported the START treaties. We had some treaties that I believed did not enhance our security—and I voted against the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. While I have generally supported the idea that bilateral and verifiable reductions of the strategic arsenals of Russia and the U.S., preserving necessary strategic arsenals of Russia and the U.S., preserving necessary strategic force structures, was stabilizing and therefore in our interest, I have never believed that this world would be more secure if the U.S. handicapped its nuclear option.

Circumstances changed. Our global foe of 30 years ago is not our primary threat today. The mutual assured destruction doctrine that held the world in nuclear check for nearly 50 years became suspect, an old strategic doctrine of vulnerability. New threats and new, vicious substate actors became the threats that brought us grief and anxiety.

We saw technologies spread to a host of rogue nations, many of which hold explicitly antagonistic postures toward the U.S. In 1998, a congressionally mandated Commission To Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States, chaired by Donald Rumsfeld, brought to light the fact that, "concerted effects by a number of overtly or potentially hostile nations to acquire ballistic missiles with biological or nuclear payloads pose a growing threat to the U.S., its deployed forces and its friends and allies." Further, the report concluded that "the threat to the U.S. posed by these emerging capabilities is

broader, more mature and evolving more rapidly than has been reported in estimates and reports by the intelligence Community." Such clarity in assessment forced us to refocus the efforts of the Intelligence Community, and they responded.

But it also forced us to continued to challenge the conventional wisdom on arms control at the time, and that required that we face up to fact that we needed to proceed with our research and development of a missile defense capability, and that, if we were serious about this, we had to recognize that we would need to abandon the ABM Treaty.

One candidate for the 2000 presidential election shared the vision of President Reagan. He recognized that the ABM Treaty was not sacrosanct. In fact, he had read the test, which plainly allowed for the U.S. to withdraw. I don't know if President Bush knew the doctrine in international law of *rebus sic stantibus*, but President Bush certainly knew that the strategic situation had changed, and U.S. national security required that we not constrain our security for tomorrow by a concept from yesterday. Such an approach was to guarantee insecurity. And President Bush understood something fundamental about strategic doctrine: insecurity does not sustain stability.

President Bush told us all that the days of the ABM were limited. And the arms control lobby went, to make a bad pun, ballistic. Abandoning the ABM Treaty with Russia would herald a new era of unrestrained nuclear competition, as both sides would try to outbid the other's arsenal with enough weapons to overwhelm, they declared with certainty bread of doctrinaire conviction.

President Bush and his advisers didn't flinch in their thinking. But they did address the question: If the fear is that withdrawing from the ABM Treaty which we did—the U.S. withdrew from the Treaty on December 13, 2001 and the Treaty was effectively terminated 6 months later—then the U.S. will match our withdrawal from the ABM with a new proposal to lower the START II levels to historic new reductions.

And on March 24 of last year, the Russian Federation and the United States concluded the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions, which will now be overwhelmingly passed as this body provides our advice and consent.

This is a historic moment for nuclear arms reduction. It is, more importantly and in my opinion, a historic moment in the evolution of arms control doctrine.

The treaty reduces operationally deployed warheads for both sides to a range of 1,700 to 2,200 by December 31, 2012. Today our arsenals are more than twice that level. The reductions are to be implemented based on the established START I verification regime and mechanism, which will be in place until 2009. The treaty allows for con-

sultation and extension of verification mechanisms beyond that time.

The Treaty allows either party to "determine for itself the composition and structure of its strategic offensive arms," meaning that we will be able to configure our triad according to the evolving needs of our nuclear posture review. The treaty does not link the objectives to our continued Cooperative Threat Reduction program, appropriately known as the Nunn-Lugar programs, recognizing all of the work the current chairman of Foreign Relations Committee and our former Democratic colleague have committed in their careers toward the cause of disarmament. I commend my colleagues on the Foreign Relations and Armed Services committees for engaging the administration in extensive discussions about continued support for this program. I strongly approve the administration's commitment to this program, and I will continue to support their budget for this.

Lord Palmerston said in the 19th century, "We have no eternal allies and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual." Our interests evolve year-by-year, and the world remains a very hostile place. Russia competes with us geopolitically, but it does so in the Security Council, not in strategic arms.

It is in the interests of the world that our two arsenals be reduced, and it is in the interests of both of our countries that we reduce them with transparency, and flexibility.

These principles are enshrined in the Moscow Treaty. I commend the administration for concluding it with Russian administration, and I urge the Russian Duma to proceed with their own ratification, as I encourage my colleagues today to join me in support of this historic treaty.

Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I rise today to express my support for ratification of the Moscow Treaty which will require the United States and Russia to reduce the number of strategic nuclear warheads to 1,700 and 2,200 each by December 31, 2012. This treaty marks an important step forward in the relationship between the United States and Russia and reduces the dangers posed by strategic nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, I am concerned that the treaty does not go far enough and I believe its flaws must be addressed if we truly want to make the threat of nuclear war a thing of the past.

It should be pointed out that at one time the administration did not even want a treaty, preferring to reach a "gentleman's agreement" with Russia instead. I am pleased that President Bush changed course and recognized the value in committing the reduction of strategic nuclear warheads to a binding, legal document.

That document now before us is welcome but its brevity—all of three pages—indicates that certain issues were left out or swept aside.